Supplementary Figures
: Results of sensitivity analysis 3. The relative importance of aerosol transmission in the absence of control measures in households in Hong Kong and Bangkok, quantified in terms of the cause-specific probability of aerosol transmission. The contour lines show the proportion of secondary infections attributed to aerosol transmission in the absence of interventions, under varying assumptions about the efficacy of randomization to the hand hygiene and surgical mask interventions in reducing contact and droplet transmission respectively. This sensitivity analysis was based on a subset of households with intervention applied within 36 hours of illness onset in the index case in the household. Supplementary Table S1 Education about the importance of a healthy diet and lifestyle, both in terms of illness prevention (for household contacts) and symptom alleviation (for the index case).
Supplementary Tables
Education on nutrition, increasing physical activity and smoking cessation for illness prevention for household contacts and symptom alleviation for the index case.
Hand Hygiene
All household members including the index case received education about the potential efficacy of proper hand hygiene in reducing transmission. Household members were taught to use the liquid hand soap provided in place of their regular soap after every washroom visit and in general when their hands were soiled or after sneezing or coughing, while they should use the alcohol hand rub provided when first returning home and immediately after touching any potentially contaminated surfaces. 1. Distribution of liquid hand soap for each kitchen and washroom (Ivory liquid hand soap, Procter & Gamble, Cincinnati, OH).
2.
Distribution of a small bottle of alcohol hand rub to each participant (221ml WHO recommended formulation I, liquid content with 80% ethanol, 1.45% glycerol, 0.125% hydrogen peroxide, Vickmans Labs Ltd., Hong Kong).
3.
Demonstration and return demonstration of proper hand washing and hand antisepsis.
All household members including the index case received education about the potential efficacy of proper hand hygiene in reducing transmission. Household members were taught to use the provided liquid hand soap provided in a clear plastic graduated dispenser for measurement of consumption after every washroom visit, before and after meals and when their hands were soiled or after sneezing or coughing. 1.
Distribution of common liquid hand soap (not antibacterial) for each kitchen and washroom (Teepol Pure, Sherwood Chemicals Public Company Limited, Bangkok).
2.
Demonstration and return demonstration of proper hand washing technique. 31 
Face Mask
Index cases and all household contacts received education about the potential efficacy of masks in reducing disease spread to household contacts if all parties wear masks. Household members were taught to wear the surgical masks provided as often as possible at home (except when eating or sleeping) and also when the index was with the household members outside of the household. 1. Distribution of a box of 50 surgical masks (TecnolThe Lite One, Kimberly Clark, Roswell, GA) for each household member, or a box of 75 pediatric masks for children aged 3-7 years. 2.
Demonstration and return demonstration of proper face mask wearing and hygienic disposal Index cases and all household contacts received education about the potential efficacy of masks in reducing influenza spread to other household contacts. Household members were taught to wear the provided surgical masks as often as possible at home (except when eating or sleeping). 1.
Distribution of a box of 50 paper surgical masks for each household member (Face Mask, Med-Con (Thailand) Co. Ltd.) and pediatric masks for children aged 3-7 years. 2.
Demonstration and return demonstration of proper face mask use and hygienic disposal.
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Supplementary 
Supplementary Methods

Statistical model for modes of transmission
To estimate the relative importance of modes of influenza A virus transmission, we decompose the hazard of infection into the three different modes of transmission (Supplementary Figure S17) . We construct a mathematical model to explicitly describe how the risk of influenza virus infection for household contacts relates to the competing risks of infection through different modes of transmission. For this objective, we use a household transmission model in which the multiple chains of transmission are mathematically described. Our model allows for multiple chains of influenza virus transmission within a household. We did not consider household contacts to be infected from outside the household after illness onset in the index case, because our observations of household transmission were truncated after a relatively short period of time since illness onset was observed in each index case (around 7 days), and because virus sequence data has shown this to be rare in similar studies (37, 38).
The general notation for the model is described in Supplementary Table S13,  Supplementary Table S14 and Supplementary Table S15 .
We assume there are three distinct modes of influenza virus transmissioncontact, droplet, and aerosol, respectively indexed by
. Since we only observed that a subject was infected or not instead of the exact mode of getting infected, we base our analysis on a fully masked competing risk model. We adopt Weibull sub-hazards for each route of transmission and assume that the time and cause of infection are independent (i.e., sharing an identical shape parameter, ). To allow a certain proportion of subjects to be immune or not exposed, we use a cure rate model (i.e. a mixture model). The following tables list the variables and notation that is used in our statistical model.
The mixture model of the probability of being immune for an individual i is modeled as
The fraction i  would not experience infection, and thus, the survivorship is scaled as
and, similarly, the density of infection is described as
The Weibull sub-hazards for modes of transmission, j= 1, 2 and 3 are written as follows: 
Interactions between three different modes of transmission are regulated by the common shape parameter only. Otherwise, we do not address the interactions due to an absence of additional biological information on which interactions could be based. Alternatively, one could adopt a stochastic process of a particular form, e.g. a multivariate Gaussian stochastic process with linear transitions of viral particles from aerosols to environment and indoor air dynamics accounting for the production and removal of virus particles in the environment (39) . Using our model, we could have slightly overestimated the hazard of aerosol transmission, if there is a strong positive correlation with droplet transmission.
It should be noted that the abovementioned hazards for contact and droplet infections incorporate the efficacy of randomization to the hand-hygiene and face mask interventions within the exponential term. Since these competing hazards are assumed to have independently acted on susceptible individuals in households, the survivor function of infection is written as
, , exp exp exp .
With only the abovementioned competing risk model, one cannot identify the contribution of each mode of transmission to overall risk of household secondary transmission event. Thus, we accounted for the protective effect of personal hygiene. Moreover, we additionally use the risk of developing fever and cough upon infection, which differs for infections from the different modes. We assume that the risk of fever plus cough caused by infections follows a Bernoulli distribution, i.e.,
Provided that the mode of transmission j was known, the likelihood function would read:
However, the cause j is not directly observable, and given the underlying model, each mode is equally likely. Thus, the full likelihood function becomes
To simplify the computation, we assume that the incubation period is a constant (1 day), and assume that we know the exact time of infection based on the time of illness onset. When there are two or more household transmission events, we consider each pair of cases and their times of infection, 
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For households in which we observed three or more transmission events, we apply exactly the same arguments to account for multiple chains of transmission.
We employ Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) within a Bayesian framework, deriving parameter estimates from the posterior distributions. For each MCMC chain, we ran 120,000 iterations with a thinning parameter 10 and the first 20,000 iterations were used as burn-in period and discarded from posterior distribution. Due to the absence of prior information from empirical studies, we set non-informative priors for each of the parameters as shown below, and impose the restrictions
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The overall density of infection at time t since infection in index cases is
in which the hazard uj h is free from interventions. We directly estimate the relative importance of aerosol transmission by employing two different statistical measures. First, in natural settings without interventions, multiple modes of transmission compete with each other to infect a susceptible individual, and one may wish to quantify the overall probability of transmission due to aerosol transmission in some interval A by
i.e., the subject is infected due to aerosol and the subject escapes infection due to all modes of transmission up to time t since infection in index case. This is referred to as the crude cause-specific probability.
Second, because we fully quantify huj for all j, the same probability if only a route j was operating can be calculated as
expressed as the product of the probability of being infected by route j and the survival probability of escaping infection due to mode j up to time t since infection in index case. This has been referred to as the net probability, 38 representing the theoretical relative contribution of route j to the transmission in the absence of all other routes. The crude probability is useful for understanding the relative contribution of each mode of transmission to actual infection in "natural settings", whereas the net probability is extremely useful for understanding an expected risk reduction of infection if a specific mode is eliminated from the population dynamics. That is, the net probability is regarded as "cause-deleted" measure that can be used to estimate the effect of a specific intervention (e.g. hand hygiene or wearing a mask) on reducing the risk of infection in susceptible contacts. 
Analysis of data from the studies in Hong Kong and Bangkok
Descriptive summary
In total, the studies in Hong Kong and Bangkok included successful follow-up of 275 and 507 index cases with confirmed influenza A, respectively. Their characteristics are summarized in Supplementary Table S1 and Supplementary  Table S2 , respectively. There was no significant difference between study arms in the risk of confirmed secondary influenza A virus infection (Supplementary  Table S3 ). In both studies, household contacts with confirmed influenza A virus infection had slightly higher but non-significant risk of fever plus cough in the intervention arms compared to the control arm.
However when the cumulative incidence of confirmed influenza infections were plotted for household contacts, we identified a change in the risk of fever plus cough that was particularly apparent in the households in Bangkok, although not so apparent in the households in Hong (Figure 1 in the main text) . In an analysis restricted to the subset of households in which the intervention was applied within 36 hours of illness onset in the index case, among which the intervention effect should be most apparent, because the intervention covers a greater part of the infectious period of the index case (11), we also identified a change in the 39 risk of fever plus cough in the hand hygiene plus face mask group in Hong Kong (Supplementary Figure S1) .
Fitted model for competing modes of transmission
The parameter estimates for the fitted model are shown in Table 1 , under the assumptions that the hand hygiene and face mask interventions reduced contact and droplet transmission by 50% respectively, from the time of application of those interventions. The cause-specific probability of aerosol transmission in the control arm for the full range of assumed efficacies of hand hygiene and face masks are shown in Figure 1 in the main text. In both Hong Kong and Bangkok, aerosol transmission was associated with the greatest cause-specific hazard, and we estimated that around half of all transmission could be attributed to this mode in the control group.
The priors and posteriors for the fitted model are shown in Supplementary Figure S3 and Supplementary Figure S4 , corresponding to the parameter estimates shown in Table 1 We plotted the sub-hazard function j h for each mode of influenza transmission in three intervention groups based on Hong Kong and Bangkok data, separately, in Supplementary Figure S2 .
Sensitivity analyses
Sensitivity analysis 1. Using fever instead of fever+cough as the indicator discriminating between modes of transmission
We identified increases in both fever and cough in the intervention arms of the studies in Hong Kong and Bangkok. Whereas in the main analysis we used the combination of fever plus cough as the proxy measure to distinguish the mode of transmission, in this sensitivity analysis we use fever alone as the indicator. The parameter estimates are shown in Supplementary Table S4 and Supplementary Figure S9 , and are similar to the results from the main analysis shown in the main text.
Sensitivity analysis 2. Using cough instead of fever+cough as the indicator discriminating between modes of transmission
We identified increases in both fever and cough in the intervention arms of the studies in Hong Kong and Bangkok. Whereas in the main analysis we used the combination of fever plus cough as the proxy measure to distinguish the mode of transmission, in this sensitivity analysis we use cough alone as the indicator. The parameter estimates are shown in Supplementary Table S5 and Supplementary   40 Figure S10, and are similar to the results from the main analysis shown in the main text.
Sensitivity analysis 3. A subset of data with intervention applied within 36 hours from index symptom onset.
Any intervention effects should be strongest among those households in which the intervention was applied within 36 hours of illness onset in the index case, because the interventions would then cover a greater portion of the infectious period of the index case (11). We therefore conducted a sensitivity analysis restricting the data to only households in which the intervention was applied within 36 hours of illness onset in the index case. The parameter estimates are shown in Supplementary Table S6 and Supplementary Figure S11 , and are similar to the results from the main analysis shown in the main text as would be expected.
Although we only analyzed a subset of the data in which the intervention would be expected to have a greater effect, our model accounts for the time of application of the intervention, and in Supplementary Figure S11 we present the estimates of the contribution of aerosol transmission in the control arms in Hong Kong and Bangkok which would be unaffected by the time at which any intervention was applied (because no intervention was applied in the control arms).
Sensitivity analysis 4. Assuming face masks reduced aerosol transmission
In the main analysis, we assumed that randomization to the hand hygiene intervention led to reductions in contact transmission, and randomization to the hand hygiene plus face masks intervention led to reductions in droplet transmission. It is possible that randomization to the face mask intervention also led to reductions in aerosol transmission (17) . In this sensitivity analysis we assumed that randomization to the face mask intervention led to half as much reduction in aerosol transmission as in droplet transmission. For example, we assumed that if face masks reduced droplet transmission by 50% they would also reduce aerosol transmission by 25%.
The results are shown in Supplementary Table S7 and Supplementary Figure S12 , and it is noted that the conclusions regarding aerosol transmission are similar to those in the main text.
Sensitivity analysis 5. Assuming some influenza infections in household contacts were not identified
Households were visited at 3-day intervals to collect nose and throat swabs from all household members regardless of illness, and all swabs were tested for influenza by RT-PCR. However it is possible that some influenza virus infections among household contacts could not be confirmed for various reasons (11, 12) . Approximately 27% and 21% of household contacts in Hong Kong and Bangkok, respectively, reported an acute respiratory illness (at least two of fever, cough, 41 sore throat, headache, myalgia, runny nose, and phlegm) during follow-up but were not confirmed to have influenza by RT-PCR. In this sensitivity analysis, we made the assumption that all subjects with acute respiratory illness were infected with influenza virus despite lack of laboratory confirmation.
The results are shown in Supplementary Table S8 and Supplementary Figure S13 , and it is noted that the conclusions regarding aerosol transmission are similar to those in the main text.
Sensitivity analysis 6. Jointly estimating the efficacy of the hand hygiene and face mask interventions
Because of the strong correlation between the assumed efficacy of the interventions and the risk of fever plus cough associated with each mode, it is difficult to robustly estimate both of these groups of parameters and in the main analysis we fixed the assumed efficacy of the interventions. In this sensitivity analysis we demonstrate the joint estimation of all parameters. The results are shown in Supplementary Table S9 . The conclusions regarding aerosol transmission are similar to those in the main text. However the posterior densities are plotted in Supplementary Figure S14 and Supplementary Figure  S15 for Hong Kong and Bangkok respectively, and one can see the lack of precision for the efficacy parameters 
Sensitivity analysis 7. Assuming the incubation period as 2 days
In the main analysis we assumed a constant 1-day incubation period, while in this sensitivity analysis we assumed a constant 2-day incubation period. The parameter estimates are shown in Supplementary Table S10 and Supplementary Figure S16 , and are similar to the results from the main analysis shown in the main text.
